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KAZAKHSTANI ARCHEOLOGY: IN THE SHADOWS OF SOVIET LEGACY AND POLITY OF NATION-BUILDING

Keywords: Archeology, Kazakhstan, Nation, and State-building in Central Asia, post-colonialism

The archeology of Kazakhstan is one of the most dynamic, if not the most publicly visible and dynamic anthropological sub-disciplines in this post-Soviet Central Asian country today. The Kazakhstani state and elite pay a lot of attention to archeology through different programs and grants. However, I argue that: after becoming independent more than thirty years ago, Kazakhstani archeology still demonstrates a strong attachment to Russian archeology as with the former academic metropole, in some sense operates in many ways in the shadows of the Soviet legacy; archeology is still heavily dependent on state ideology or used by it as a nation-building tool.

Anthropology in the US includes four major subfields: social-cultural, archeology, bio/physical, and linguistics. In this essay, I focus on archeology, which is now the most dynamic subfield of anthropology in the post-Soviet Central Asian country of Kazakhstan. I argue that despite Kazakhstan's independence more than thirty years ago, Kazakhstani archeology still demonstrates a strong attachment to and even some form of dependency upon Russian archeology, the seat of the former academic metropole. Along with the issue of dependency, another aspect of post-coloniality within Kazakhstani archeology is its involvement in the state- and nation-building process. Here in Kazakhstan, archeology is widely used as a nation-building tool and as an ideological pillar of the imagined nation, a concept informed by Benedict Anderson's view of nation-building (*Anderson 1991*).

This phenomenon of applying archeology as one of the major nation-building tools is a widespread phenomenon among developing and developed countries, and Kazakhstan is no exception to this trend. In Bangladesh, for example, politicians and philosophers identified archaeological sites and museums as “the repositories for symbols of heritage and national identity” (*Smith 2000*). Another example is Zimbabwe, where material remains of the past became sources of inspiration for national institutes (*Manyanga, Katsamudanga 2013*). Likewise, in the Russian Altai region which neighbors Kazakhstan, Altai nationalists use archeological discoveries as a source for local ethnohistorical myths (*Mikhailov 2013, 41*).

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Is Kazakhstani Archeology still “Soviet”?

I open this essay with the question: is Kazakhstani archeology post-1991 independent from its Soviet legacy, or does it still operate in its shadows? My answer is based on interviews with Kazakhstani archeologists who graduated in the late Soviet period² and early 2000s from state universities in Almaty and Nur-Sultan (Astana). These interviews show that contemporary Kazakhstani archeology, a subfield of anthropology, remains in a “transitional zone” (transitioning from the Soviet to the Kazakhstani post-Soviet mode of being). Attachment to and influence from the former Soviet, now Russian, academia are still very prominent features in this zone, even though some steps towards promoting independent Kazakhstani agenda have already been completed, such as the training of specialists in non-Russian academic centers, the collaboration of Kazakhstani specialists with EU or North American institutions and research centers, and the publication of Kazakhstani research in foreign academic journals.

There are several reasons behind the Kazakhstani connection to Russia, being that the latter had been the traditional center of academic knowledge production that was established and nurtured during the Soviet period. First of all are the long-established ties between Russian and Kazakhstani archeologists which are based on the common experience of studying together during the Soviet period and/or defending Soviet Ph.Ds (*kandidat* and *doktor nauk* degrees) under the same academic mentor. The second reason is the use of Russian laboratories and facilities by Kazakhstani researchers. The third reason is the training of Kazakhstani Ph.D. students in Russia’s universities whose diplomas confer a prestigious status, especially universities in Moscow and Saint Petersburg³. These trainings ensure collaboration between Russian experts and scholars in Kazakhstani research programs. And finally, the fourth reason is a perception, persistent in Kazakhstan, of Russia as a country with a strong academic tradition and a somewhat similar cultural background based on Soviet historical experience, not to mention a common language (Russian).

During interviews and meetings with several Kazakhstani archeologists, I discovered that many of their advisors were prominent archeologists who had graduated from Soviet Kazakhstani or Soviet Russian institutions and universities. For example, Karl Baipakov (1940-2018) graduated in 1963 from the *fakul'tet* of History, where the Department of Archeology is housed, at Leningrad State University⁴. Baipakov played an important role in the excavation of Otrar, a medieval city that became an important symbol in the Kazakh nation-building process (*Bustanov* 2015). According to my interviews, some Kazakhstani students went and defended their dissertations in Russia’s academic centers, such as Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Kemerovo, or Chelyabinsk because of already existing and established academic ties with their advisors. This tradition of existing and established academic ties continues today within the current generation of Kazakhstani scholars who are trained in the Russian Federation and in turn keep the legacy of the Soviet/Russian anthropological schools afloat in Kazakhstan.

Russian archeology has an esteemed reputation in the former-Soviet space. One of the reasons why Russia still attracts graduate students from across the former USSR is that Russia still offers *kandidat nauk* degrees and second doctoral degrees (*doktor nauk degree*), whereas Kazakhstan has moved to the European degree system, or the so-called “Bologna three-level program” of Baccalaureate, Master, and Ph.D⁵. The legacy and power of the Russian doctoral degrees are still considered “prestigious” in Kazakhstan, even more so than local degrees.

Moreover, the power of a Russian degree could be considered to be a form of active cultural survival. As a result, some archeologists prefer to defend their dissertations in Russia and in Russian, which is not logistically and financially easy for many of them. From interviews with the former Kazakh

graduate students who in early 2000s studied in Russian universities I got that that living in Russian large cities on monthly scholarship (*stipendia* in Russian) was not easy, even travel and buying air or train tickets from Almaty to the Russian cities was difficult in financial terms for them.

However, several Kazakhstani archeologists are critical of degrees obtained in Russia, arguing that for field experience Kazakhstani students should still come to Kazakhstan for summer field schools (a regular practice in training archeologists all over the world). And usually, after they graduate from Russian universities, Kazakhstani archeologists remain in Kazakhstan. To show the strength of Kazakhstani archeology, one of my informants mentioned that their experience of excavation of the steppe mount burial sites (*kurgans*), specifically excavations and studies of the Bronze Age and early Iron Age steppe graves and settlements, was very professional. According to this informant, Kazakhstani archeologists feel that they are more experienced in steppe *kurgan* excavation than their Russian colleagues, who, "... just don't excavate as many *kurgans* as we do, because our [Kazakhstani steppe – U.B.] is full of them; there are thousands and thousands of them across the country" (*Zh. and Ah. 2021*)⁶.

Despite the state's efforts to raise local cadres trained abroad, including social scientists, Kazakhstani archeologists mostly get trained at home. They are often trained in the tradition of Kazakhstani academia, which inherited a large part of its legacy from the Soviet period and is still strongly connected with Russia. Throughout the thirty years of independence, there have been only a small number of social-cultural anthropologists with degrees from the EU or North America (Canadian or US universities). However, not many of those who were trained in archeology abroad in EU or North American universities returned to Kazakhstan to continue working in Kazakhstani archeology. Among Kazakhstani universities that have western style academic programs, Nazarbayev University is the only one that has a separate department of Sociology and Anthropology, where contemporary anthropology is taught. But even this university does not provide Ph.D. degrees in the discipline.

Research resources such as labs also ensure the continuation of the Russian anthropological legacy in archeology. Both my informants and mass media sources point out that the Russian language continues to be the center of laboratory analysis, even among different types of lab expertise⁷ including various artifacts, such as stones and biological materials. In response to my question "why not choose Western universities?", the informants' primary answers are: price, already established ties, and the legacy of the Russian language which is still the lingua franca in the post-Soviet space.

Devaluation of Kazakhstani currency (*tenge*) to the US dollar and Euro makes foreign lab expertise prohibitively expensive for many Kazakhstani archeologists⁸. However, some archeologists confirmed that despite the price, they send their materials to the EU and Western archeological laboratories to conduct faster analyses. In such instances, the funding often comes from state-provided grants. Although recently Kazakhstani anthropologists started to use local facilities and specialists, local archeologists say that they still highly rely on Russian laboratories and research centers.

Along with training and cooperation with Russian academia, Kazakhstani anthropologists and archeologists continue to publish in the Russian language and in Russian academic journals. This can be explained by linguistic dependency, already established ties between publishers and authors, and the short amount of time and pressure deadlines for grant cycles or Ph.D. programs. Many of these are well-known names, such as V. Zaibert and Z. Samashev, who have published outside Soviet academic spaces, and who continue to publish in Russian academic journals and language (*Outram et al. 2009*). This strong relationship between Russian publishing houses and local archeologists

is influenced by two major factors: 1) a majority of the Kazakhstani archeologists are not proficient enough in English (and/or other foreign languages) to be published in a non-Russian language journal; 2) Kazakhstani state-run Ph.D. programs (which are three-year programs) require Ph.D. students to finish a certain number of publications in non-Kazakhstani journals (but not necessarily Western journals) in a short amount of time. As a result, Kazakhstani Ph.D. students who are majoring in social sciences and humanities, including archeologists, are practically forced to publish as fast as they can, and for many of them, it is more convenient to publish in Russian.

However, in private talks, several Kazakhstani archeologists shared that despite these ties and established relationships they sometimes feel some “arrogance” directed at them by their Russian colleagues, often based on the imagined “supremacy” of Russian academia. It may be that the use of the term “arrogance” reflects Kazakhstani academics’ assumption of a scholarly skepticism from their Russian colleagues. Yet, Kazakhstani archeologists perceive this critique in a post-colonial sense, as a way of understanding how former colonial “academic masters” try to diminish their local achievements and show the “underdevelopment” of local scholarship. I do not deny the existence of a sense of superiority demonstrated by Russia’s specialists, however it is not a widespread phenomenon. The contemporary generation of archeologists includes people who are 40-50 years old and were raised during the Soviet period, but were mostly trained in post-Soviet Kazakhstan under a sense of nationalist sentiment. They, like many Kazakhstanis, have a deep sense of belonging and nationalism, which can explain their reactions to their Russian colleagues’ critiques.

At the end of this section, I would like to point out that Kazakhstani archeology has its own agenda, as it has its own preparation centers for graduate students. From the time of establishment of the Kazakhstan Institute of Archeology (1945), Kazakhstani archeology, like all other academic disciplines, went through a nativization of academic cadres. During this period, several generations of local and locally-trained academic cadres appeared within Soviet Kazakhstan. After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstani archeology gained its independence from the Center’s specialists. But the established connections with the Russian “academic metropole” are still strong and play a significant role in producing Kazakhstani academic cadres. And yet, not only do the Soviet past and present connections form a dependence on contemporary Russian academia, but they also link the development of anthropology/archeology and the state’s nation-building policy, which I now begin to discuss below.

The “Curse” of the “Golden Man”

During my fieldwork that I conducted for my Ph.D. dissertation and for other research projects over the past seven or eight years, I witnessed daily encounters between different representatives of Kazakhstani society. These encounters made it visible that Kazakhstani society, especially its ethnic Kazakh part, is engaged in an intensive identity search, in which ethnic nationalism becomes a focal point (*Sharipova, Burkhanov, and Alpeissova* 2017). The Kazakhstani public follows constructed propaganda promoting a nationalistic and glorious narrative of the past, where history is highly mythologized. Such myths are not unique across post-Soviet space and are similar to the process that happens in neighboring Russia, as is the case with Fomenko’s alternate version of Russian history as an example (*Laruelle* 2012). Kazakhstan’s nationalist narrative is partially built on alternate histories, inventions of the past, and conspiracy theories (*Galiev* 2016), where the idea that “Kazakh history was hidden by Russians/Soviets” takes center stage.

The Kazakhstani state and its officials cannot ignore such calls for the revision and reimagining of history. For example, the former President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, recently announced that Kazakh history textbooks should be “...reviewed, checked for ‘mistakes’, and new textbooks should be published”⁹. The ruling elite and high-ranking officials constantly emphasize the ideological and patriotic upbringing of the Kazakhstani youth and population in general. In doing so, they often follow Soviet ideological paths. One example is the creation of the group Zhas Otan (Young Motherland), an analog of the Soviet All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol), along with many other mass initiatives.

In one of his nationwide messages entitled, “Seven Facets of the Great Steppe”, the former President Nazarbayev wrote that “the Eurocentric point of view did not allow to see the real fact that the Sakas, the Huns, the Proto-Turkic ethnic groups were part of the ethnogenesis of our [Kazakh nation – U.B.] nation” (Nazarbaev 2018). Despite the call for not following the Eurocentric view, the sense of a systematic comparing and contrasting with European countries is always implicit or explicit in the leadership’s messages. For instance, at the beginning of his message, Nazarbaev states “[i]n fact, if you think about the history of the German, Italian or Indian people, the question of the relationship between the territory and the great achievements of these peoples during a thousand-year history quite rightly arises” (Nazarbaev 2018). Kazakhstani society and the ruling elites continue to look to the past through a Eurocentric lens, fostering a sense of subalternity through endless daily comparisons. On the grassroots level, one’s imagined past is compared to the “greatness” of the constructed histories of other nations across the world.

At the moment of independence, Kazakhstani elites wanted to see visible and tangible — material and written — confirmation of the great and ancient past of the Kazakh people and Kazakh land by substantiated facts. Such a concerted effort to show first to the former colonial center that Kazakh history, a history of nomads is also ancient and, at least, equal to the history of neighboring Russia or/and Central Asian countries, are a result of the Soviet nationality policy, according to which a strong emphasis was given to state-sponsored evolutionism (Hirsh 2005, 7-9). In this state-sponsored evolutionism, Bolsheviks designated Kazakh nomads (along with many other native communities of Central Asia and Siberia) as people living in “backwards” conditions, where, for Bolsheviks, “backwardness” was a result of sociohistorical terms. Contemporary elites and common Kazakhstanis keep reimagining this state-evolutionism in traumatic ways. Thus, the search for the “glorious past” is one of the central tasks given by the state to Kazakhstani scholars, including anthropologists.

The former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was in power for almost three decades since Kazakhstan’s independence, was always attentive to nation-building by reimagining the past. At the head of the state, he sponsored several initiatives and nationwide programs, such as “*Madeni Mura*” (“Cultural Heritage”) or “Sacred Geography”. In these programs, local academics closely studied the material and cultural heritage and history of Kazakhstan (Medeuova, Sandybaeva 2018; Tseyrempilov, Bigozhin, Zhumabayev 2021). Like other social science and humanities disciplines, archeology (and anthropology at large) could not avoid involvement in the nation-building process. However, during interviews and personal meetings with Kazakhstani colleagues, I received complaints that several of these state-sponsored programs and initiatives started in quick succession, one after the other, and ended abruptly. As a result, the programs did not build towards a stable scientific research process or base.

Archaeological discoveries from the Iron and Bronze age that are found on territory of medieval urban centers and are often found via state-sponsored programs, become widely covered by mass media. These artifacts are then presented and interpreted in nationalistic and patriotic tones in terms

of “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). In other words, images of the archaeological artifacts became part of the everyday landscape by either being seen in school textbooks, on posters, or on city billboards. They also became visible in the form of monuments in city centers, in popular music videos, and other displays. The news about the new golden archeological findings was broadcasted throughout all country and state-run newspapers, such as “Egemen Kazakhstan”¹⁰, in addition to major newspapers online and news websites¹¹.

Like in the Soviet Union, the state’s influence is visible through financial control of the academy, whereby university departments of history and institutes of archeology are almost fully dependent on state funding. State support of academic institutes and research centers is one of the remnants of Soviet practices. For example, the Institute of Archeology in Kazakhstan¹², a major institution, stays afloat through the material support of the Ministry of Education and its annual call for state-sponsored grant projects. Grants are awarded upon the decision of a committee made up of scholars and officials who decide what projects should receive the annual grant programs’ support. This dependence on state grants is an extremely bureaucratic and time-consuming process, but it is often the only source of financial stability for archeologists within Kazakhstan’s institutes, departments, and research centers. Only a few archeological centers and archeologists have limited alternative options, including well-paid gigs for archeological expertise from oil and gas companies. Few archeological teams take part in international projects and grant programs with or without foreign colleagues.

As a result of the state-run programs, the majority of archeological teams push themselves to do non-stop excavations in the steppe, which lead to descriptive collections of materials. Such descriptive narratives become more developed than analytical concepts vis-a-vis an analysis of the already excavated artifacts. One of my informants, a Kazakhstani archeologist, shared in an interview:

“If we would get the money, we would have our fieldwork season. If not, it means we would not have enough money to stay alive. That’s why we do endless excavations, instead of focusing on what was already found and kept from Soviet times and after. We have tons of unanalyzed materials in our museums, institutes, and archeological archives, but we need these grants to stay afloat, they [grants – U.B.] provide us [our] salaries”.

Several well-known archeologists, like Z. Samashev, have already made calls for slowing down archeological excavations in favor of focusing on a deeper analysis of the already excavated materials and those that have been kept in local museums.

Despite a lack of well-trained specialists to analyze, reconstruct, and interpret the already excavated artifacts and sites, the heads of archaeological departments, teams, and institutions are not eager to send their young colleagues to study or long-term internships abroad. Several archeologists in interviews mentioned that missing summer excavation season is not good for finding field experience, and that this is one of the reasons for not capitalizing on travel to and training at archeological centers and departments except for those in Russia. This makes sense, since the majority of archeologists depend on state grants, and the heads of the archeological teams, who are often academic authorities, do not let their young scholars (who are often Kazakhstani MA and PhDs) pursue education in non-post-Soviet space. In other words, these established academics use the brains and muscle power of fresh academics to get the state’s financial support to sustain their research team.

This part of the chapter is called “The Curse of the ‘Golden Man’”. The “Golden Man” is one of the most well-known and praised archeological artifacts of the Scythian period of what came to be Kazakhstan’s territory. The Golden Man, or *Altyn Adam* in Kazakh, was found in 1970 during an archeological expedition in the Issyk area (near Almaty) that was led by one of the “founding fathers”

of Kazakhstani archeology, K. Akishev. The Golden Man has already received national recognition and is seen in books, monuments, pictures, and even state university symbols¹³. The symbolic (and material) power of Issyk's Golden Man is so immense that this archeological artifact became a cliché archeological success. Now current archeological projects are often measured by the success of their excavations vis-à-vis the Golden Man.

In the post-Soviet period several other “Golden Men” were found in different parts of the country, which often belonged to different historical periods and ancient cultures. But each of these were all labeled as the “New Golden Man”¹⁴. Finding and possessing each of the “New Golden Men” became a matter of the country's national prestige and pride. The idea of having one's “own” Golden Man or other significant archeological discovery became very important for local mayors (*akims*) of the regions (*oblasts*). There is often rivalry between regional heads on the matter of whose oblast had more “New Golden Men” or another similar (great) archeological discovery. Having their “own” “New Golden Man” is also used as a political tool for gaining fame or even maybe influence and recognition on a national level. It was also used similarly as a measure of mayors' career success, by looking good for the central apparatus in the capital. Some of the regional officials try to financially support and offer political patronage to archeologists who come to study the areas under these officials' control during excavation seasons. As a result, state, regional, and local officials become patrons for local archeology.

However, for some archeologists the symbolic power of the Issyk Golden Man burial became a “curse”. It created extra pressure from central and local officials to discover one, and it contributed to a particular focus on high-value discoveries and the development of academic research. Several archeologists shared in anecdotal and ironic terms how local officials during meetings would often ask, “Is it possible to find a New Golden Man in [such and such] region or area”? Hence, the level of administrative support and local funding for archeologists could partially depend on how useful they could be in the search for something that equated to the Golden Man.

Along with patronage within archeology, some state officials support studies of their home region heritage through cooperation and joint publications with leading archeologists. The book entitled “*Saraichik*” is about the archeological past of the Golden Horde, which was published as a joint project between the high-ranking official, Imangali Tasmaganbetov, and archeologist Z. Zainolla Samashev (*Tasmaganbetov, Samashev* 2001). This book is an example of such patronage and cooperation where the regional sense of belonging, state, and academia all become bound together. Tasmaganbetov was born and raised in the west of the country and served in several high-ranking administrative positions in the state hierarchy, such as the head (*akym* in Kazakh) of the western Kazakhstan region (*oblast'*), Minister of Defense, Mayor of the capital, and Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Russia¹⁵. Tasmaganbetov published at least three different books touching on the history of the western Kazakhstan region.

The legacy of the Soviet academic past did not end with the fall of the USSR in 1991. We see that different forms of cooperation, if not dependency on some aspects of the Kazakhstani side from Russia, still take place. Kazakhstani anthropology/archeology still operates in the “shadow” of the former Soviet metropole when it comes to international cooperation, expertise, and publications. Russian universities and Russian academic degrees are still attractive to Kazakhstani graduate students in comparison with Western ones. These programs and degrees are often chosen based on the connections and ties established during the Soviet period. The language in which Kazakhstani archeology operates both on local and international levels is still predominantly Russian, which is one of the colonial legacies left by the USSR.

Another aspect of post-coloniality in Kazakhstan's archeology, along with being connected to and partially dependent on the former academic center, is that it serves as one of the tools of nation-building in Kazakhstan today. Nation-building is deeply connected with the narrative and reimagination of the past, in support of which archeology can bring material pieces of evidence of the existence of previous inhabitants of the steppe. In other words, archeology strengthens the nationalistic narrative that the Kazakh steppe was not a "barren" area, and that the Kazakh people's ancestors were not less developed than neighboring nations. The state is the main financial and legal patron and "customer" of archeologists, and state officials expect that anthropologists, along with many other social scientists and humanitarians, bring strong pieces of evidence to support a contemporary vision of the Kazakh nation as an "Eternal Nation". Such undertakings depend on centralized funding, which often leads to the endless excavation of new artifacts at the expense of leaving a more detailed analysis behind.

Примечания

¹ The most famous one is the so-called "Altai Princess" or Ukok plateau Scythian era mummy.

² As an anthropologist, who received a Ph.D. from a US university in 2017, I was questioned several times by local Kazakhstani academic and non-academic people who, with some amusement, asked: "Why did you get a degree in the US, but not Moscow, Russia"? As a response to the question I asked "Why do they think that Russian or "Moscow" education is considered better than American"? People often replied that Kazakhstan has a strong cultural and linguistic tie to Russia and a long experience of coexistence and friendship with the Soviet state.

³ Alfrid Bustanov brilliantly showed in his article, "From Tents to Citadel: Oriental archeology and textual studies in Soviet Kazakhstan", how political interests and newborn Kazakhstani academia were involved in the Soviet nation and building policy in Kazakhstan (Bustanov 2015). In his paper, Bustanov focused on the birth of Kazakhstani Oriental studies and what is important for this paper is the foundation process of Kazakhstani Soviet archeology when the Institute of Archeology was established in Almaty in 1945. After WWII the generation of Soviet-trained native Kazakh academic cadres appeared when prominent figures, such as Alkei Marghulan and Kemal Akishev, Karl Baipakov, and Zeinulla Samashev played and continue to play an important role in the creation of Kazakhstani archeology as a discipline.

⁴ <http://old.unesco.kz/heritagenet/kz/rus/portret/baipakov.htm>

⁵ <https://eua.eu/issues/10:bologna-process.html>; <https://bilimdinews.kz/?p=123568>

⁶ I abbreviate the names of my interlocutors and interviewees to protect and anonymize their identities.

⁷ <https://avestnik.kz/sarmatskij-vozhd-v-zolotom-oblichii/?fbclid=IwAR0AONvtVpzhYmz3CtnC7CEkCOywp9rtYMLdhEb3PBq7mAqslTct7imG4>

⁸ This devaluation happened twice in 2014 where the price for the dollar jumped roughly from 150 tenges to 430 tenges.

⁹ <https://kaztag.kz/ru/news/tokaev-poruchil-razrabotat-i-vnedrit-edinye-uchebniki-istorii-kazakhstana-i-mira>

¹⁰ See egemen.kz/article/172549-tarbaghataydan-tonalmaghan-ekinshi-altyn-adam-tabyldy as an example.

¹¹ See https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/novyie-sensatsionnyie-arheologicheskie-nahodki-predstavili-373600/ as an example

¹² http://www.archaeolog.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=7&lang=en

¹³ Like, for example, in Eurasian National University in the capital of Nur-Sultan (<https://www.enu.kz/>), and it even became a vodka brand!

¹⁴ See <https://ru.sputnik.kz/regions/20180806/6725421/zolotoj-chelovek-nahodka.html> as an example.

¹⁵ https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=30104900

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Абстракт

Археология Казахстана сегодня является одной из, если не самой публичной и динамичной антропологической субдисциплиной в этой постсоветской среднеазиатской стране. Казахское государство и элита уделяют большое внимание археологии через различные программы и гранты. Однако я утверждаю, что: став независимой более тридцати лет назад, казахстанская археология по-прежнему демонстрирует сильную привязанность к российской археологии, как к бывшей академической метрополии, в некотором смысле действует во многом в тени советского наследия; археология по-прежнему сильно зависит от государственной идеологии или используется ею как инструмент национального строительства.

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